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The Bankers and the ‘Nameless Virtue’ 
Tom Sorell 
Introduction 
Morally conscientious people sometimes blame themselves for things that are 
not within their control. The driver who unavoidably kills someone 
nevertheless kills someone, and because it is normally awful to have killed 
someone, it makes sense for the driver to blame him- or herself. It makes 
sense, although the death was not the driver’s fault. Blame also makes some 
sense where a driver who does not kill anyone but who does not maintain his 
or her car properly, identifies with someone else who runs a child over through 
failure to maintain the car. Although there has been no bad outcome of the 
second agent’s negligence, the second agent feels guilty for having carelessly 
increased the risk of the same kind of road death that the first agent is actually 
responsible for. This sort of expansive self-blame is probably not entirely 
rational; but it can be admirable all the same.1 
Susan Wolf (2004) has connected scruples about matters outside one’s 
control with a ‘nameless virtue’ that acknowledges our involvement in a world 
where things are inevitably affected by luck and chance. This context of 
contingencies, according to her, should not be taken to be irrelevant to 
ascriptions of responsibility, as if the only thing we can take blame or take 
responsibility for is how we direct the will. Human agency is not just a matter 
of what is willed but of what happens for better or worse when one’s will is 
translated into action. Expansive self-blame is, according to her, an expression 
of this mixed context of human action (see also Walker, 1993). It gets over the 
gaps in responsibility otherwise created by moral luck. It is not just open to 
individuals acting on their own behalf, she says, but to powerful role holders 
acting ex officio in institutions. It is the virtue that is displayed when leaders 
of businesses or governments are quick to take responsibility for bad 
outcomes even when they or their institutions are not strictly or wholly at fault. 
When we are dissatisfied with the reluctance of leaders to respond 
appropriately to bad things that happen on their watch, we may be in sensing 
a failure to exercise a virtue that Wolf’s account identifies and helps to define. 
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There is a connection between the nameless virtue and the global financial 
crisis (GFC). Many ask why the bankers have been so slow to apologise or 
why their apologies have been so meagre when taken together with the cost in 
public money of bank bailouts. Wolf’s account suggests an answer: namely, 
the lack of the nameless virtue. The bankers’ lack of this virtue also explains 
the half-heartedness with which they have introduced a new culture into banks 
after the GFC. In short, the absence of this virtue helps make sense of the 
disapproval we feel for the principal players in the crisis. On the other hand, 
the arguable presence of the virtue in one exceptional UK banker—Sir James 
Crosby—may explain why, virtually uniquely, he seems to deserve admiration 
for the way he responded to his role in the GFC. In other words, the presence 
or lack of the nameless virtue seems to rationalise reactive attitudes it has been 
natural to direct towards some bankers since 2008. The nameless virtue does 
not function merely, as Wolf suggests, to allow attributions of responsibility 
to stick in conditions of moral luck. 
I shall try to say something about the limits of expansive self-blame as a 
virtue. Sometimes that sort of blame is insufficient for taking responsibility 
appropriately, even when it is accompanied by public expressions of remorse 
or regret. One reason is that taking responsibility appropriately sometimes 
requires an agent to submit to judgement by others, paradigmatically through 
legal proceedings and, in particular, by exposing themselves to proportionate 
punishment determined by independently devised and independently applied 
standards.2 Self-blame often does not meet these independence requirements. 
Again, except where it is psychologically so far-reaching that it dominates 
one’s consciousness and is, for a time at least, inescapable, self-blame need 
not reach the threshold for being punishing at all. Minimal self-blame—a 
matter-of-fact acknowledgement of fault—is sometimes not enough for taking 
responsibility appropriately, even when self-blame is heartfelt and is 
expressed publicly. 
This point seems particularly compelling where an agent—either an 
individual or an organisation—takes blame for a very bad outcome but is so 
rich or powerful that bearing even major money costs is easy and hardly alters 
the quality of life. In cases like these, self-blame by itself seems not to register 
on the scale for appropriately taking responsibility. Even if rich and powerful 
wrongdoers feel so bad about something that they are put off their champagne 
and caviar for a week, that cost may be so slight and forgettable for them, all 
things considered, as to be hardly any payment at all. 
This is where the nameless virtue appears to come in, for it is expressed not 
in minimal but expansive self-blame. In fact, however, the nameless virtue 
does not even help with understanding the one case in which a leading banker 
has gone beyond feeling bad about the crisis and has given up money and 
symbols of status to demonstrate his or her contrition even when not directly 
responsible for a bank failure. To the extent that postulating the nameless 
virtue helps us admire the atonement of James Crosby, it produces the illusion 
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that his response sets the pattern for the morally appropriate banker’s response 
to the crisis. It does not, for two reasons: Firstly, it does not impose a 
sufficiently high financial cost, and secondly, personal roles in systemically 
important banks are subject to more than norms of personal character, norms 
that are properly legal and impersonal. 
The Nameless Virtue 
A good place to begin is with the following passage from Wolf’s ‘The Moral 
of Moral Luck’: 
There is a virtue that I suspect we all dimly recognize and commend that 
may be expressed as the virtue of taking responsibility for one’s actions 
and their consequences. It is, regrettably, a virtue with no name, and I 
am at a loss to suggest a name that would be helpful. It involves living 
with an expectation and a willingness to be held accountable for what 
one does, understanding the scope of ‘what one does,’ particularly when 
costs are involved, in an expansive rather than a narrow way. It is the 
virtue that would lead one to offer to pay for the vase one broke, even if 
one’s fault in the incident was uncertain; the virtue that would lead one 
to apologize, rather than get defensive, if one unwittingly offended 
someone or hurt her. Perhaps this virtue is a piece or an aspect of a 
larger one, which involves taking responsibility not just for one’s 
actions and their consequences but also for a larger range of 
consequences that fall broadly within one’s reach. One may offer to pay 
for the vase one’s child broke or offer to take the blame for the harm 
someone suffered as a result of the practices of an agency of which one 
is the head. Like other virtues, this one is a matter of offering the right 
amount (whether it be of compensation, apology, or guilt) at the right 
time to the right person in the right way. It’s not the case that the more 
responsibility one takes for the harms that lie at increasing distance from 
one’s control, the better. Yet one ought to take responsibility for more 
than what, from a bystander’s view would be justly impersonally 
assigned. 
(2004, pp. 121–122) 
Wolf distinguishes here between the nameless virtue and a larger one of which 
the nameless virtue is a part. The larger virtue—which involves taking 
responsibility for things beyond what one does but still within ‘one’s reach’—
will turn out to be more relevant to the case of the bankers and the financial 
crisis than the narrower one. But before we come to that, the nameless virtue 
deserves discussion. 
Firstly, the nameless virtue may not be nameless. ‘Conscientiousness’, 
which is Wolf’s own gloss at times, comes close to it, and that is the term I 
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shall use throughout. Conscientiousness in the relevant sense is not quite the 
same as ‘conscientiousness’ in ordinary English. In the ordinary sense, 
‘conscientiousness’ might mean the disposition always to try to do the right 
thing, including by not doing harm or by making up for harm that one has 
done, including despite oneself. A conscientious agent in this sense might not 
go in for expansive self-blame, knowing that he or she had characteristically 
done his or her best to do the right thing. Again, the conscientious agent in the 
ordinary sense of ‘conscientious’ might behave as he or she does if her or she 
alone expected him- or herself to do right or abstain from harm. Wolf’s 
nameless virtue, on the other hand, operates specifically in response to a 
convention of being held accountable (the central case of which is being held 
accountable by others), and it appears to be a matter of internalising a 
communal or social standard and applying it to one’s own actions and to 
actions of those suitably related to oneself. 
Although Wolf does not spell this out, conscientiousness in the relevant 
sense seems to lie somewhere between, and to counteract, two character 
defects—one of underestimating one’s socially assigned sphere of 
responsibility for harm and one of over-estimating it. Underestimating one’s 
socially assigned sphere of responsibility might be characteristic of a self-
indulgent person. To the extent that such a person is disposed to take 
responsibility for things at all, it might take the form of offering to do the least 
inconvenient thing in response to harm. At the other extreme is the uncommon 
trait of over-estimating one’s responsibility. This might occur in a person who 
is treated or treats him- or herself as some kind of jinx, or as irremediably 
clumsy and disruptive, and who apologises even for things that are not his or 
her fault. Alternatively, it might be the trait of someone who self-importantly 
exaggerates the effects of his or her actions or his or her power to benefit 
others. The expression of this latter defect might be or resemble officiousness. 
To be officious is to take it upon oneself to act in circumstances in which it is 
neither useful nor requested by others whose interests are at stake. By contrast 
with officiousness, conscientiousness responds in a timely way to genuine 
need, sometimes unspoken need, and produces assistance to meet it while 
being considerate of the beneficiary’s feelings about receiving assistance. 
Unlike someone who is careless or self-indulgent, the conscientious agent also 
considers whether he or she has fallen short in detecting or acting 
appropriately to meet need ‘within his or her reach’. 
When taking responsibility for wrongdoing that he or she is not directly 
responsible for, the conscientious agent adopts a broad view of the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate for him or her to benefit those who 
have been adversely affected. Wolf does not say what happens when the 
conscientious agent is in a position to take the credit for doing something right 
or beneficial, but because he or she thinks conscientiousness is a kind of 
acknowledgement of the way the will is enmeshed in a world also containing 
contingency, one expects that either conscientiousness or some allied virtue 
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will work to make one minimise one’s estimate of one’s own contribution to a 
good outcome. Here conscientiousness might have the effect of an agent’s 
ascribing to good luck some or all of his or her success in carrying out a rescue 
or in being at the right place at the right time to offer some particular effective 
assistance. In this way conscientiousness in relation to bad outcomes in one’s 
ambit might be the other side of the coin of humility or self-effacingness with 
respect to good outcomes. 
Conscientiousness in Wolf’s sense must be related somehow to justice. 
Presumably the just person does not necessarily take an expansive view of his 
or her responsibility, as the conscientious person does; otherwise 
conscientiousness would not be a nameless virtue but rather justice itself or 
an aspect of justice. To allow for a distinction in this area, let us call the just 
but unconscientious person ‘merely just’. The merely just person may not 
wonder whether, when he or she obeys the letter of a legitimate law, his or her 
actions also reflect its spirit. Suppose he or she claims tax deductions that he 
or she is entitled to, while thinking that it would be better for the public 
treasury to have more money to discharge the policies that tax collection 
finances. This may be where, to forgo the deductions, the agent has to feel the 
force of the more exacting virtue. Conscientiousness has to take over from 
justice. 
In relation to penal law, one could imagine the conscientious person being 
prepared to plead guilty to a charge with a more serious penalty than the 
charge that has actually been brought against him or her, or being prepared to 
plead guilty to more counts of the same crime, if he or she is in fact guilty of 
the more serious crime or more counts of the same crime. Suppose he or she 
is on trial for a breach of a secrecy law in, as he or she thinks, the public 
interest, and suppose he or she has not confessed to some further illegal 
disclosures he or she has in fact made that could attract fresh charges. Justice 
without conscientiousness might involve pleading guilty only to existing 
charges; justice with conscientiousness might involve confessing and pleading 
guilty to more. Conscientiousness, then, seems not only to exclude the evasion 
of legal responsibility, as justice does; conscientiousness also seeks out 
responsibility where law has been leniently applied or where it gives out 
altogether. Thus, expansive self-blame can be in place even when the bad 
things one has done or allowed to happen contravene no regulations. 
According to Wolf, what I am calling conscientiousness might be part of a 
‘larger virtue’ 
which involves taking responsibility not just for one’s actions and their 
consequences but also for a larger range of consequences that fall 
broadly within one’s reach. One may offer to pay for the vase one’s 
child broke or offer to take the blame for the harm someone suffered as 
a result of the practices of an agency of which one is the head. 
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(2004, p. 121) 
We could call the smaller virtue ‘personal conscientiousness’ and the larger 
virtue 'wide conscientiousness'. Does Wolf have a coherent conception of this 
larger virtue? I shall suggest that she does not but that there is something of 
value to be distilled from the elements of her account. This will have a bearing 
on taking responsibility in the complicated case of the financial crisis. 
Although it is hard to be sure on the basis of the little before us, Wolf may 
associate with the larger virtue at least the responsibility one takes on by 
acquiring a certain role, such as parent or agency head. But there are reasons 
to think that these do not work well as illustrations of the way the larger virtue, 
if there is one, works. For example, it is a familiar part of parental 
responsibility to apologise for one’s children’s transgressions and even, as in 
the example, to compensate those adversely affected by what the children 
have done. Or at least this seems to be part of parental responsibility when 
children have themselves not reached the age of responsibility. The parent of 
a careless 40-year-old does not seem to be irresponsible if he or she refuses to 
pay for the denting of someone’s car in an accident. Only so long as one’s 
children are ‘under one’s control’—typically before adulthood—are their 
actions widely taken by parents to be the parents’ responsibility. It is doubtful, 
however, that acknowledging parental responsibility in the usual way would 
rise to the threshold for being virtuous. It seems too routine for that. Perhaps 
the threshold is reached by parents who take responsibility particularly 
promptly and are such good judges of appropriate compensation that there are 
never hard feelings on the part of those who have been adversely affected. But 
otherwise it is too routine a disposition to be given special moral credit. 
Holding an office in an ‘agency’ and taking responsibility for its bad 
practices is different from conscientiousness as a parent of young children. In 
Wolf’s example, it is possible to take the blame for the ‘practices of an agency’ 
as its head, presumably because one has directed people whom one manages 
to engage in those practices or because, although the practices were engaged 
in without one’s permission, they were supposed to accomplish a purpose for  
which it is one’s job as agency head to see accomplished in the right way. That 
is, although one has not authorised the practices, their connection to the 
agency’s purposes and employees cannot honestly be disowned by the agency, 
and because one is the head of the agency, then ex officio one ought to own 
them, too. Whether, when one does so, one is exercising a personal virtue is 
far from clear. Perhaps someone who is unconscientious in their personal life 
could apply an agency policy of taking responsibility without endorsing that 
policy and perhaps while disagreeing with it. If so, then taking responsibility 
ex officio may come apart from personal conscientiousness. The case that 
seems to fit in best with Wolf’s theme is where the agency has no policy and 
the head is being advised by others to take no responsibility. In that case, the 
head acts when he or she takes responsibility or blame: it is not just agency 
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policy or the board acting through him or her. It is as if, in displaying wide 
conscientiousness, the agent personifies the agency and internalises the blame 
he or she claims on behalf of the agency. 
Under the conception of conscientiousness that Wolf operates with, agents 
who go in for expansive self-blame both show signs of good ‘psychic health’ 
and display a virtue. They show good psychic health because they do not adopt 
the over-detached viewpoint of a bystander on their own actions, or on the 
actions of those they are connected with, even when those actions are not in 
their control. Disassociating oneself from the killing of the dead child when 
one is the driver is a case of over-detachment and threatens to make one 
psychologically compartmentalised and conflicted rather than unitary and 
whole. As for why conscientiousness is a virtue, Wolf’s suggestion is that it is 
similar to, or possibly a case of, an undoubted virtue that does have a name: 
generosity: 
Perhaps the more obvious reason for regarding [conscientiousness] as a 
virtue is that, when applied to harmful actions, this trait is a species of, 
or at least akin to, the well-established virtue of generosity. Generosity 
generally involves a willingness to give more—more time, more money, 
more lenience, more, in one way or another, of oneself than justice 
requires. In offering to pay for the broken vase or in trying to provide 
comfort to the grieving family beyond what a rationalist assignment of 
liability would demand, an agent benefits or tries to benefit others at 
cost to herself. That this should be seen as virtuous is not hard to 
understand. 
(2004, p. 122) 
Something goes wrong in this explanation of why conscientiousness is a 
virtue, but, as I will go on to claim, it is an instructive and suggestive mistake 
and one that will prove helpful in our discussion of blame-taking in the 
financial crisis. 
What goes wrong is that Wolf runs together two different kinds of virtue—
on the one hand, being generous, and on the other, being willing to bear 
significant costs as a way of being seriously contrite. Being generous is giving 
more than is required by justice. But to display generosity in this sense is not 
necessarily to do so at a cost to oneself, or at least an appropriately significant 
cost to oneself, which is where additional exactingness comes in. 
To see this, consider a merchant with 100 melons to sell. If he or she gives 
away 20 melons to some very hungry passers-by, they will feel much better. 
The merchant is not obliged by justice to donate the melons: the passers-by 
are not starving, and although they are not rich, they can afford to buy the 
melons. In these circumstances, making a gift of the melons is generous. But 
let us stipulate that had the merchant not given away the melons, they would 
have remained unsold and would have had to be thrown away uneaten. The 
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stipulation makes it true that the merchant does not forego income by giving 
away the melons. By the same token, it in fact costs nothing to give the melons 
away. To the extent that he or she bears a cost it is in the epistemic sense: for 
all he or she knew, he or she would have been forgoing income. In fact, the 
merchant gives the melons away at no additional cost and so sacrifices 
nothing. What is more, let us stipulate, the loss of the melons would make no 
noticeable difference to the merchant’s felt wellbeing or to the wellbeing of 
those depending on him or her. This is an example of generosity—in the sense 
of a donation above the level required by justice—but at no personal cost. 
It is easy to adapt the point to making reparations in a case in which one is 
not personally to blame. Suppose your friend has broken a stranger’s vase, and 
you happen to have been given two identical vases, only one of which you 
have ever used. Let us stipulate that the unused duplicate is a delightful vase 
so that it amply fills the void left by the now broken vase in the stranger’s 
house. It is generous of you to part with a delightful vase as recompense for 
someone else’s damage. But it is generosity at no cost. Had the vase not been 
offered in recompense, it would have lain unnoticed, gathering dust in a 
cupboard. Generosity seems to be a matter of more than satisfying the 
requirements of justice: It is not this as well as sacrifice or taking a loss. 
Is the conscientiousness under discussion a kind of generosity? Yes, 
because it is expansive blame taking with the corresponding willingness to 
offer more help to whomever is directly disadvantaged than is required by 
mere decency or even justice. One assumes liability in cases where one is not 
strictly responsible. One helps as if one had in fact been responsible, not as if 
one were merely a disconnected bystander. The willingness to give more than 
is strictly required is what is generous. On the other hand, the appropriateness 
of giving help at significant personal cost comes not from the expansiveness 
of expansive blame but from its being blame. To blame oneself is to have 
beliefs in common with those who think one ought to be punished: one has 
done wrong and should somehow pay for it. Feeling bad—experiencing agent 
regret—is not that payment; compensating the victim might be. But the feeling 
indicates the willingness of the agent to bear a significant cost. If no 
significant cost is borne, then agent regret seems to issue in business as usual, 
not action that is particularly praiseworthy and that reflects well enough on 
the agent to point to virtue. A payment that is too easy for the agent, although 
it is a payment, is not a payment that registers as appropriate in both the 
perspective of a blamer and a punisher. I am suggesting that this more exacting 
test of appropriateness—being costly from the perspective of both agent and 
punisher—is the one that has to be met by people who display the nameless 
virtue. The application of this suggestion will become clearer when the 
discussion turns to bankers. 
Now expansive blame- taking is harder to read as virtuous the more it is ex 
officio blame- taking, the more it is blame-taking for large-scale harm or 
damage, the more that damage is at least partly attributable to an agency much 
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bigger than a single person, and the more the resources used to pay for the 
harm or damage are not personal resources but those of an agency. To enlarge 
on these points in turn, ex officio blame taking by an individual is not 
necessarily personal blame- taking nor personally endorsed blame -taking, nor 
therefore personally virtuous. The individual may simply be the channel for 
apology or payout. Secondly, when what an agency is blaming itself for is 
large-scale harm or damage, the threshold that has to be reached for simple 
compensatory justice to be done and certainly to be seen to be done may 
already be very high—so high that claims of generosity as opposed to mere 
justice are likely to seem disputable. Thirdly, where an agency is the relevant 
agent and the agency is large and possibly collective, the agency may not be 
easily intelligible as a bearer of virtue:. Vvirtue tends to be defined for 
individuals capable of excellences contributing to species flourishing. 
Fourthly, the greater the resources of an agency, the harder it is to bear out the 
claim that the agency has paid enough to be generous. 
Finally, large-scale disaster seems to demand expansive blame taking from 
even partly responsible agencies and their figureheads: It does not seem to be 
a case of noblesse oblige. If the disaster is big enough, not only regret or blame 
taking but prompt action to compensate victims seems to be obligatory. In the 
more extreme sort of case, justice seems to drive out what is discretionary and 
therefore what can be considered generous. Not only is expansive blame- 
taking and the appropriate compensatory action demanded, but the standard 
of appropriate action can be very exacting. 
Indeed, in the case of very large-scale disasters, less than personal 
tirelessness on the part of relevant agency heads is sometimes thought to be 
unseemly. When a BP oil well leaked in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, for 
example, it did not do for the BP chief executive to take a holiday break during 
the initial clear-up efforts, even though he seems to have behaved 
conscientiously before reaching the point of considering a vacation. On the 
contrary, holidaying while the oil leaked was portrayed as outrageous personal 
behaviour, notwithstanding the fact that many others at BP were still attending 
to the problems in the Ggulf. Wolf’s account does not seem to extend to the 
case of personal responsibility for the actions of such large-scale agencies, 
especially when things go very wrong. It is as if the size or power of the 
agency, or the scale of its bad effects, disrupts the virtue framework. Fault fills 
up the space that would otherwise have been created by the expansiveness of 
expansive self-blame, and responsibility- taking that would have looked 
supererogatory in more domestic settings starts to look obligatory for the 
agency, with the result that there is not enough discretion left to the head of 
the agency to act in a way that seems personally virtuous. 
Not only is ex officio blame- taking harder to regard as virtuous than in 
propria persona blame -taking; in practiceitalics it also tends to be less of an 
option. After all, it can be required by one’s office to limit the acknowledged 
liabilities of the agency. This requirement, what is more, can be morally 
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inspired, because the money lost by admitting liability can be that of relatively 
weak or vulnerable people connected to the agency (e.g., small shareholders), 
or can involve losses to others (e.g., vulnerable clients). 
The Global Financial Crisis 
Although the damage done to many Western economies by the financial crisis 
has far exceeded the environmental damage caused by the BP oil spill, few 
bankers in leadership positions in ‘systemically important’ banks3 in the United 
States and Western Europe have done more than make apologies ex officio, and 
usually ceremonially, in set-piece confrontations with inquisitorial legislators 
before the television cameras. A Washington Post report4Brady Dennis. 
Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, April 9, 2010 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/08/AR2010040804865.html 
  for 9 April 2010 sets the tone: 
Two top Citigroup executives who guided the bank along its disastrous 
path toward massive losses and multiple government bailouts expressed 
regret Thursday during testimony before a panel investigating the 
financial crisis [. . .] 
‘Let me start by saying I’m sorry,’ Prince told members of the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. ‘I’m sorry the financial crisis has 
had such a devastating impact on our country. I’m sorry for the millions 
of people, average Americans, who have lost their homes. And I’m sorry 
that our management team, starting with me, like so many others, could 
not see the unprecedented market collapse that lay before us’. [. . .] 
In an opening statement, Rubin cited numerous factors—including 
low interest rates, sharp increases in housing prices, misguided credit 
ratings and excessive risk-taking—that contributed to the unprecedented 
crisis. But he framed the breakdown at Citigroup and other companies as 
a collective failure, in which ‘almost all of us [. . .] missed the powerful 
combination of forces at work and the serious possibility of a massive 
crisis. We all bear responsibility for not recognizing this, and I deeply 
regret that’. 
These comments make it seem as if the failures at Citigroup were failures to 
discern the effects of complex financial forces to which bankers were related 
as mere observers. In fact, those forces were unleashed by bankers through 
the establishment of shadow banks and successful lobbying for permissive 
regulation on acquisitions of financial services companies by banks, and their 
ill effects would have come to the notice of top management earlier if internal 
processes had been more robust. In Citigroup in particular there was a culture 
of not reporting bad news, and there was misinformation within the firm about 
Commented [W2]: AU: Please provide author/website title 
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the size of its holdings in securitised mortgages. It had been assumed in the 
company that many of those holdings had been sold on. 
In the UK, too, bankers have also gone in for highly detached apologies, 
where they have made apologies at all. The following exchange5In the 
footnote (fn 5) in February 2009 between the chair of the Treasury Committee 
of Parliament and the former CEO of the government-rescued RBS, Sir (now 
just plain Mr) Fred Goodwin, is indicative: 
Q760 CHAIRMAN: Sir Fred, one of the members of the public said to me this 
morning, ‘Do the institutions know what they have 
done to ordinary people’s lives, families and jobs?’ 
Everyone in the room pays some form of tax to the 
UK Government, and the UK Government has 
forwarded shed-loads, lots of money, to your 
institutions. What are we getting? In terms of your 
approach, some people say you have been hesitant 
to say ‘sorry’, so I am giving you your opportunity 
now. 
SIR FRED GOODWIN: Thank you very much for that, Chairman. I 
apologised in full, and am happy to do so again, at 
the public meeting of our shareholders back in 
November. I too would echo Dennis Stevenson’s 
and Tom [McKillop]’s comments that there is a 
profound and unqualified apology for all of the 
distress that has been caused and I would not wish 
there to be any doubt about that whatsoever. 
The strangely impersonal ‘There is a profound apology’ instead of a simple 
‘I’m sorry’ is particularly striking --so striking that . Ccertain discourse 
analysts have studied bankers’ expressions of contrition (see Hargie et al., 
2010). 
Few heads of systemically important banks have voluntarily resigned; none 
has personally started a programme of recompense to damaged shareholders 
and people irresponsibly sold inappropriate financial products; and many have 
resisted regulatory proposals intended to enforce greater prudence in banking 
and a return to the core banking purpose of intermediation for productive 
commercial investment. There is a widespread public sense of the 
insufficiency of ex officio apologies by bankers and of their willingness to 
cooperate with banking reforms. At first sight, it is a strength of Wolf’s 
account that it enables us to articulate the nature of the insufficiency: Did 
certain bankers fail to take responsibility for things that possessors of the 
nameless virtue would have taken responsibility for? If so, then perhaps what 
keeps the apologies from being satisfying is the absence of the nameless virtue 
in bankers making the apologies. 
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I shall dispute this diagnosis of the bankers’ failure to take responsibility. In 
what follows I shall distinguish between taking responsibility for the financial 
crisis and taking responsibility for mismanagement leading to bank failure or 
mismanagement of a systemically important bank leading to a rescue to 
prevent failure. No one person is responsible for or can take responsibility for 
the financial crisis. But if they are placed correctly in the power structure of a 
particular bank, especially a systemically important bank that is known by its 
management to be systemically important, individuals can be responsible or 
mainly responsible for particular bank failures and also the costs of 
government pre-emption of a failure (Sorell, 2018). In these latter cases, there 
is scope for the personal exercise of the nameless virtue. But in these cases, 
too, the nameless virtue can fail to be sufficient from a moral point of view. I 
come to such a case in the next section, but I begin with responsibilities in and 
for the financial crisis as a whole. 
The GFC is in part the responsibility of institutions and not only 
systemically important banks. These institutions include, in the private sector, 
specialised mortgage lenders, insurers, hedge funds, credit-rating agencies, 
accounting firms, and lobbying firms. In the public sector, institutions with 
responsibility in the crisis include sovereign wealth funds, a very wide array 
of regulatory bodies closest to the biggest financial markets in the United 
States and the UK, the big U.S. government-backed mortgage providers, 
Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac, and some sub-departments of the U.S. 
legislature concerned with the reform of banking law. In addition to 
institutional agents in the financial crisis, there are a host of irresponsible 
individual borrowers in real estate markets, individual dealers in derivatives, 
individual mis-sellers of mortgages, individual risk raters within banks and 
others. 
In considering so complex an array of actors, it may be tempting to think 
that lines of responsibility are irremediably tangled so that blaming individual 
institutions, let alone particular people, is out of the question. But this is a 
mistake, attested to by the fact that no one connected to the banking industry 
denies the distinction between systemically important banks and others and 
because all of the systemically important banks had clearly identified 
leaderships, some of which had been in place for decades, as in the case of 
Lehman Brothers. Although not all systemically important banks in the crisis 
needed to be rescued, those that did have all publicly admitted to one kind or 
another of management failure or market misjudgement or risk 
miscalculation, and the hierarchies of these banks, and job descriptions of top 
executives, were well-enough defined to indicate where the loci of ex officio 
responsibility lie. In general terms, those at the top of the hierarchy of a 
systemically important rescued bank from around 2000–2007 are prime 
candidates for the ascription of personal responsibility in the crisis. 
It is true that over the period that led up to the crisis, the growth of ‘shadow 
banking’—I explain what that is shortly—and the development of new 
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markets in financial derivatives may have proceeded at such speed that no one, 
not even those at the top of the systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs), would have been able to exercise suitable controls. If this conjecture 
is true, conditions for virtuous responses to the failure of SIFIs start to be in 
place. If no one could have stopped the runaway train of shadow banking, 
then, had more heartfelt apologies been made by top bankers in response to 
the crisis and stronger gestures of recompense and reform, those apologies 
and gestures might have started to look like exercises of the nameless virtue. 
To come to shadow banking, a number of regulatory changes, mainly in the 
United States, had the effect over decades, but especially after 1999, of 
weakening the banking regime that had prevailed in the United States since 
the Great Depression (see Johnson & Kwak, 2010, especially Chapters 4–6). 
The decisions to bring in these regulatory changes and create the conditions 
for shadow banking were neither monumental nor irreversible, but their 
effects were significant, and crucially, they were made under the active 
influence of bankers. Under the regime established in the United States 
immediately after the Great Depression, banks operated under relatively strict 
requirements to hold capital against liabilities, and there were limits on the 
interest rates they could offer to both retail and commercial customers. This 
conservative regime was maintained to avert another banking crisis, not to 
maximise growth in the banking industry. The banking industry-supported 
growth of retail and commercial money markets made it possible to sidestep 
these restrictions—money market funds are not legally banks, although they 
offer services similar to those of banks and were marketed to customers as 
facsimiles of banks. 
Within money markets, particular funds could legally pay higher returns to 
retail depositors than in the deposit insurance-protected retail banking sector 
while also offering checking privileges and on-demand withdrawals or 
‘redemptions’ of holdings. They also enabled commercial organisations to 
make more profitable use of cash reserves and to exploit the commercial 
possibilities of financing long-term investment with short-term borrowing. 
Commercial borrowers with good credit ratings could even insure against 
defaulting on short-term obligations by paying others—sellers of the class of 
derivatives called credit default swaps—to take on those liabilities. An 
important form of long-term investment was securitised packages of 
mortgages sold in different risk-rated tranches. These securitised products 
included, at the riskier end, collateralised debt obligations, the market that 
collapsed for many of the rescued systemically important banks. 
Although there is a much longer story to be told here than I have space for 
(Dempsey & Sorell, 2018), the creation of money markets, along with 
developments in the sale of securities based on risk-rated tranches of 
mortgages, are important instalments in the narrative of the financial crisis. 
Partly on the strength of this narrative, many bankers have disputed the role 
of immorality in the events of 2007–2008. Instead, they have tended to admit 
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to costly but excusable misjudgements of a wide variety of risks, including 
risks of illiquidity in money market finance and risks of a downturn in the 
American real estate market. The less repentant bankers’ position can be put 
roughly as follows: 
Although misjudgements of risks were undoubtedly costly, they were 
made in good faith, broke no criminal laws, and fell afoul of no financial 
regulator’s requirements at the time. What is more, the risks in question 
were hard to judge, and considerable intelligence was put by banks into 
modelling them so that they could be better understood. If the models 
failed, that is not because they were unsophisticated through negligence 
but because, despite great expenditures of time, money and brain power, 
they were not sophisticated enough. In any case, the deficiencies of the 
models are not to be traced to moral malignancy, and the deficiencies 
couldn’t have been that great; otherwise people could not have made as 
much money as they did before 2007. 
This is the sort of position that invites or is consistent with the interpretation 
of the financial crisis as a case of very bad moral luck for the bankers and 
therefore as a potential site for the operation of nameless virtue on the part of 
those moved to apology, or serious banking reform, in response to the crisis. 
According to this interpretation, the moral character of any decisions made 
under uncertainty seems to depend on how they turn out, and the complex 
lending and borrowing decisions that underlay the financial crisis, although 
they went well and made many people rich in the early 2000s, eventually 
turned into a disaster. If bankers, particularly those in the rescued 
‘systemically important’ banks, are amongst those to be blamed for this 
disaster, then they also deserve credit for the good times. Either that, or both 
the good and bad times are matters of luck, and neither credit nor blame is in 
order. 
Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that bad moral luck was operating 
when the collapse of the wholesale money markets drove many systemically 
important banks to the brink of failure and Lehman Brothers to outright 
bankruptcy. That is, suppose that many investment decisions made in good 
faith went wrong through no carelessness on the part of bank management. 
Had the leaders of the rescued systemically important banks possessed the 
nameless virtue, they would have taken responsibility even so. This would 
have meant offering abject apologies at least to those adversely affected. The 
victims of the financial crisis are legion. They include sub-prime borrowers in 
the United States, taxpayers across the developed world, elderly savers, poor 
non-taxpayers whose welfare provisions and other services have shrunk in the 
period of austerity following the recession, and credit-starved businesses. 
Foreign sovereign holders of the debt of countries at the heart of the crisis—
the UK and the United States—have also been adversely affected. Then there 
are all those caught up in the global recession that has followed the crisis. In 
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fact, few if any of these groups have been compensated, let alone quickly or 
spontaneously. 
If moral luck creates conditions for exercises of the nameless virtue, does 
the GFC—with its arguable accretions of moral luck—create conditions for 
it? Suppose the answer is yes. Then couldn’t the nameless virtue have guided 
the leaders of the ‘systemically important’ banks to do some of the things—
make abject apologies, devise compensation schemes partly funded from 
personal wealth, or take part in vigorous banking reform—that they have been 
so roundly criticised for omitting to do? 
In considering this question it is important to recall a conclusion argued for 
earlier: 
Expansive blame taking is harder to read as virtuous the more it is ex 
officio blame-taking, the more it is blame-taking for large-scale harm or 
damage, the more that damage is at least partly attributable to an agency 
much bigger than a single person, and the more the resources used to pay 
for the harm or damage are not personal resources but those of an agency. 
The damage of the financial crisis is on too large a scale and too extreme to 
call for a response informed by a purely personal virtue. Again, as was pointed 
out earlier:, 
large-scale disaster seems to demand expansive blame taking from even 
partly responsible agencies and their figureheads: it does not seem to be 
a case of noblesse oblige. If the disaster is big enough, not only regret or 
blame-taking but prompt action to compensate victims seems to be 
obligatory. In the more extreme sort of case, justice seems to drive out 
what is discretionary and therefore what can be considered generous. 
The scope for generosity, and so for the nameless virtue, seems to be very 
limited in the case of large-scale disasters, including the GFC. This seems to 
be true notwithstanding the operation of moral luck. The moral luck in the 
crisis, such as it was, depended on unavoidable loss of control and 
irremediable uncertainty surrounding investment decisions and innovations 
such as securitised real estate instruments. 
Even if the outcomes of myriad investment decisions involving esoteric 
financial instruments were indeed beyond senior bankers’ control, the 
establishment of shadow banking and departures from traditional norms of 
banking prudence were not. The rescued systemically important banks 
operated actively and deliberately in the shadow banking sector and took 
advantage of its looser capitalisation requirements and near anonymous, 
highly leveraged dealings in the derivatives market, which in turn contributed 
to the liquidity problems and share-selling panics that constituted the crisis 
proper. As I shall now argue, those actions should be seen as cases of injustice, 
which are far more serious than failures to exercise the nameless virtue. 
Claiming as much is perfectly compatible with saying that many investment 
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decisions made within the shadow banking sector were subject to uncertainty 
and moral luck. But, by the same token, it is not the failure to operate nameless 
virtue that justifies our sense of the insufficiency of the bankers’ reaction to 
the crisis but their injustice. 
Elsewhere (Dempsey & Sorell 2018), I have contributed to a detailed 
narrative of the events of the financial crisis in New York and London as 
background for the claim that some heads of major New York banks were 
personally responsible, not just ex officio responsible, for some of the 
damaging events of the crisis, including the failure of Lehman Brothers and 
the near failure of other large banks. There is wide agreement, for example, 
that most of the systemically important banks over-borrowed in the early 
2000s. It is widely agreed that there was an overconcentration of investment 
in real estate, especially through different kinds of securitised instruments. It 
is widely agreed that models employed by credit-rating agencies for 
measuring the risk of investments and the financial strength of banks were 
deeply flawed. Even if none of these factors was individually sufficient to 
cause the crisis, jointly they make its outbreak less than surprising. Nor are 
these just judgements in hindsight. All of these matters were seen as worrying 
by some in the banking industry before 2008. Some systemically important 
banks even escaped the need for government rescue by behaving more 
prudently against the trend of risk taking. JP Morgan, for example, was far 
less leveraged at the height of the crisis than other Wall Street institutions,6 
which put it in a position to acquire Bear Stearns when the latter faced 
bankruptcy. Similarly, Lehman Brothers executives had raised questions about 
its exposure in the real estate market quite some time before it failed but were 
overruled by those at the top (Sorkin, 2009, pp. 124ff). 
The point of this narrative is that responsibility in and for the crisis was not 
exclusively collective or organisational: Some of it was individual 
responsibility, especially where some identifiable person making high-level 
decisions in a systemically important bank had held a leading position in such 
a bank for decades and had great latitude to implement a wide variety of 
strategies but chose what in retrospect were very risky ones. People meeting 
this description—Richard Fuld and Sanford Weill to name two—had powerful 
positions in Lehman Brothers and Citigroup, respectively, and there were 
other, similarly highly placed, people in some of the U.S. mortgage 
originators, such as Countrywide. 
Some of these figures had to unlearn or actively dismantle the traditional 
norms of banking to over-borrow, to overinvest in real estate, and to move into 
financial services that, in the United States at least, had been closed to banks 
by law ever since the Great Depression. At least one leading banker, Sanford 
Weill, was actually instrumental in the repeal of the relevant legislation, the 
Glass-Steagall Act. Because many of the accounting and investment practices 
engaged in by the big banks in the early 2000s were self-consciously anti-
traditional and, by traditional standards, highly imprudent, there were reasons 
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for suspecting that things might go wrong quite apart from the inscrutability 
of trading algorithms or the complexity of higher-order collateralised debt 
obligations. In short, there was a flight from traditional prudence in lending 
and investment practice, although traditional prudence had not been 
discredited. How does this translate into injustice? 
The systemically important banks put at risk deposits and share prices with 
policies that, because they avoidably increased the probability of losses, were 
unjust to depositors and shareholders. The banks did not make sufficient 
provisions to pay back their debts, adding injustice to creditors to their list of 
wrongs. When their collapse was imminent, they turned to the government 
they previously claimed had over-regulated them to bail them out, adding to 
the huge over-indebtedness of the United States and diverting funds that might 
otherwise have gone through social security and other benefits to the worst-
off Americans. Here again there was injustice. Under further U.S. government 
policies that add to the injustices attributable to banks in relation to taxpayers, 
banks have been able to divest themselves of ‘toxic’ assets—without being 
exposed to the full scale of the losses that they would otherwise have had to 
face—injustice again. 
The Case of James Crosby 
We can distinguish the financial crisis from the failure of particular banks. We 
can also distinguish the difficulty of taking personal responsibility for the 
crisis from taking personal responsibility for the mismanagement of a 
particular bank. The leaders of rescued systemically important banks have a 
personal share in the complex responsibility for the financial crisis, but they 
may have a much larger share of personal responsibility for the expensive 
rescue of individual banks that would otherwise have failed. 
Are there no cases of leaders of rescued systemically important banks 
expansively taking responsibility? Are there no leaders of systemically 
important banks, in other words, who displayed the nameless virtue? One 
apparent exception—perhaps the sole apparent exception—to the rule of half-
hearted contrition is James Crosby, ex-chief executive officer of Halifax Bank 
of Scotland (HBOS). He was heavily criticised in a report from the UK 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards in 2013, which in its turn 
was a response to the imposition by the UK FSA of a large fine on the HBOS 
chief financial officer. After giving a short summary of the issues that 
concerned both the FSA and the Parliamentary Commission, I shall describe 
Crosby’s, at first sight, impressive, response to the criticisms directed at 
himself and other HBOS executives. 
At first sight, Crosby’s actions seem to show the nameless virtue in action, 
and what is more, the nameless virtue being displayed by someone at the top 
of a systemically important bank. Perhaps he did display the nameless virtue. 
I shall argue that impressive as that was, it was an inadequate response to his 
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failings as a bank executive because the costs Crosby imposed on himself do 
not appear to be to proportionate to the failings for which he was ostensibly 
claiming responsibility, or to his own resources. We can have a sense of the 
insufficiency of a banker’s response to the financial crisis, then, even when 
the nameless virtue is present. 
Crosby’s gestures are best understood against the background of the near 
failure of HBOS and its rescue by Lloyds Banking Group in 2006. 
HBOS resulted from the merger in 2001 of a large UK retail mortgage 
provider (Halifax) and the Bank of Scotland (BoS). Before 2001, BoS had a 
retail and corporate banking business in Scotland and a smaller presence in 
England based on telephone banking and niche services connected to high-
value mortgages and deposits. In corporate banking it concentrated on 
commercial real estate lending and servicing management buyouts. Its merger 
with Halifax gave it a retail depositor base in England, which put HBOS in a 
position to compete with the so-called Big Four in the UK as a new universal 
bank. 
Crosby set an aggressive growth strategy. He aimed at exceeding the 20 per 
cent share of the market that Halifax had achieved in its core (retail) markets, 
and he sought to build its commercial loan book and commercial depositor 
base. Its international division attempted to establish a presence in Australia. 
Between 2001 and 2008, according to the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards,7 the group loan book more than doubled. But especially 
in commercial real estate, the loans were often of very doubtful quality, were 
often riskily financed in the wholesale money markets rather than from 
deposits, and were not often enough syndicated, so that HBOS took the risk 
of default alone. Eventually these big risks materialised on the HBOS books 
as ‘impairments’ or large write-downs of the value of loans.8 In its 
International Division HBOS’s impaired loans as a proportion of its total loans 
were strikingly high by comparison to its competitors, typically more than 
twice as high as its competitors in the Irish market.9 In Australia, nearly a third 
of its loan book was impaired at a time when Australian banking was avoiding 
entirely the losses of financial institutions closer to the epicentre of the 
financial crisis. Even after 2008, impairments continued to be staggering in 
scale: The Parliamentary Commission estimate for retail loans between 2008 
and 2011 is £7 billion.10 
In addition to bad loans, HBOS was overcommitted to short-dated money 
market funding for financing them. This was because its deposits were 
relatively low in comparison to the loan obligations it had taken on. As a 
result, HBOS was very vulnerable to illiquidity in the money markets. This 
vulnerability was recognised as early as 1 March 2005, when Crosby was still 
in charge of the bank, and although steps were taken to increase deposits and 
bring in longer-dated money market financing, HBOS’s overall dependence 
on short-dated credit was not significantly reduced. The day after Lehman 
Brothers failed, HBOS, too, had in effect failed. Lord Stevenson, who was 
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chair of HBOS from the time of the merger with Halifax, denied in evidence 
to the Parliamentary Commission that its failure was due to anything other 
than the seizing up of the wholesale markets. But the commission is scathing 
about that claim. For them, HBOS simply had too little capital. According to 
the report, 
The HBOS failure was fundamentally one of solvency. Subsequent results 
have shown that HBOS would have become insolvent without injections 
of capital from the taxpayer and L[loyds]B[anking]G[roup].11 
The Parliamentary Commission claims that failings within HBOS were 
compounded by a malfunctioning regulatory regime in the UK. The FSA, 
although it raised questions about HBOS credit risks in 2003, about its ability 
to meet the requirements for a Basel II waiver—allowing it to be its own judge 
of capital adequacy—and about the effect on HBOS of the turbulence in New 
York, had been too ready to accept reassurances from HBOS officials that 
turned out to be ill founded.12 
Not that the FSA held no HBOS bankers responsible for HBOS’s troubles. 
It served an ‘enforcement notice’ on Peter Cummings, head of the Corporate 
Division, in September 2012. This imposed a fine of £500,000 (reduced after 
lawyers’ negotiations from £800,000) for failure to exercise due skill and care 
in the management of HBOS and for failure to manage risk at BoS. The fine 
punished the policy of growing the loan book quickly at the cost of a 
disproportionately high rate of impairment. 
In evidence to the commission, Cummings complained of being singled out 
personally and complained, too, of the FSA’s targeting HBOS when other 
banks were in a similar position. Up to a point, the commission agreed with 
Cummings. They concluded that not one person but four should have been 
pursued by the FSA. In addition to Cummings, they named (i) the long-serving 
chair of HBOS, Lord Stevenson, (ii) Crosby, who served as HBOS CEO until 
2005, and (iii) Andy Hornby, who succeeded Crosby. The FSA’s simply 
allowing the ‘Approved Person’ status of each of these three to lapse was 
insufficient. All three should have been barred from any further role in UK 
financial services.13 
There was no noticeable response from Lord Stevenson and Hornby to this 
recommendation. Crosby, on the other hand, promptly resigned his remaining 
(and lucrative) financial services positions and offered to return his 
knighthood, no doubt having had   in mind the fact that the disgraced CEO of 
the government-rescued RBS had had his knighthood unilaterally removed. In 
addition, Crosby voluntarily took a 30 per cent reduction in his HBOS 
pension. 
At least at first sight, these gestures seem honourable. Certainly they stand 
out from the meagre apologies and protestations of events beyond their control 
that have come from other prominent bankers on both sides of the Atlantic 
since 2008; in addition, they come from someone who left HBOS several 
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years before it failed and who oversaw its considerable growth after the 
merger. This fact in particular seems to justify the claim that Crosby was being 
criticised by the Parliamentary Commission for things beyond his control and 
that, even so, he exercised the nameless virtue. Because there was an 
opportunity to rethink his strategy after he left and to introduce more 
prudence, Crosby is perhaps not first in line for the criticism that he brought 
the bank irresponsibly to the brink. Stevenson, who presided over the bank the 
whole time, is perhaps the guiltiest of the three. 
Although Crosby deserves blame as architect of a policy that was 
insufficiently attentive to building up deposits and reducing dependence on 
wholesale markets, the fact that he made his gestures in 2013, eight years after 
leaving the bank, the fact that he did so promptly (relative to the publication 
of the Fourth Report of the Parliamentary Commission), and the fact that he 
did so at some cost to himself, may indeed make his gestures prima facie 
expressions of Wolf’s ‘nameless virtue’. Admittedly, his relation to the 
downfall of HBOS is not that of pure bystander, but his hand was not on the 
tiller when HBOS could have saved itself by changing course. So, in a sense, 
Crosby accepted a cost for something that he was not fully or directly 
responsible for: the bank’s affairs for the whole period from 2001 to 2008 and 
in particular the bank’s failure and the need for rescue years after he left. 
For these gestures to deserve classification as expressions of the nameless 
virtue, they have to impose a cost on the agent that makes sense not only from 
his perspective but also from the point of view of someone who wants to mete 
out punishment. That was the conclusion reached in the first section of this 
chapter, when I reviewed some of the shortcomings of Wolf’s own explication 
of the nameless virtue purely in terms of generosity. If Crosby had shown his 
remorse by privately slapping his own wrist, or by depriving himself for a year 
of a favourite recreation, that would presumably have fallen far short of a 
prima facie expression of the nameless virtue, just because it was too slight a 
cost relative to the enormity of the HBOS failure and its consequences. By 
being willing to pay a higher financial and reputational cost in a highly public 
way, Crosby went much further, far enough to exercise the nameless virtue. 
But was that far enough? 
A relevant consideration is the size of the payment relative to Crosby’s 
resources. The main financial sacrifice he made was to forgo 30 per cent of 
his pension. But it is a very big pension. The effect of the sacrifice was to 
reduce the annual payment to himself from £560,000 to £406,000. This hardly 
puts Crosby in the poor house. On the contrary, it leaves him with an annual 
income after retirement more than 80 times higher than that of the average 
private-sector worker in the UK.14In the footnote (fn14) In addition, because 
he left HBOS in 2005, Crosby did not suffer the kind of losses that other 
leaders of distressed and failed or rescued banks experienced when the 
relevant share prices plummeted. On the contrary, he sold two-thirds of his 
shares in HBOS in 2006, considerably before the crash. As for the knighthood, 
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that would probably have been taken away (with greater ignominy) if he had 
not given it up. The fact that he surrendered it voluntarily probably left his 
profile raised and his reputation in a better state than that of many other 
bankers. In short, reputationally at least, Crosby’s gesture cut his losses. 
As already made clear, it would be unfair to give Crosby no credit for his 
responses to the Parliamentary Commission. When they are compared with 
the total inaction of the two colleagues who were criticised alongside him, and 
the protestations of helplessness from other bankers, one feels that Crosby did 
quite a lot right, even if he did not give back enough or take responsibility 
early enough. We have already conceded that he exercised the nameless virtue. 
The problem is that exercising the nameless virtue does not go far enough. I 
am not claiming that Crosby bore no real costs (although they may have been 
insufficient) but that he acted as judge in his own case of how high the relevant 
costs should be, and in the end he was perhaps an overly lenient judge. What 
is missing in his response to the commission is the impartiality and 
independence in the determination of costs that (ideally at least) is associated 
with institutional justice. 
In this respect Wolf seems to me to be wrong to extend the operation of the 
nameless virtue from personal life to personal action within big public or 
public-aspected roles. Wrongdoing with big consequences carried out in 
institutional roles is not answerable only or primarily to norms of personal 
character or norms of appropriate personal emotional response. The big public 
roles, including the role of leading a ‘systemically important’ bank, have an 
ineliminably impersonal, institutional aspect (Sorell, 2018). This impersonal 
aspect is captured by some of the legal constraints on wrongdoing in office—
by the fact that some wrongdoing is classified as crime—and, short of this, by 
the fact that one can be made legally ineligible to play certain kinds of 
potentially damaging public roles, including the role of bank director. 
The Parliamentary Commission has recommended the introduction of a 
criminal offence of reckless banking to capture the kinds of wrongdoing that 
have eluded FSA rules in the UK and that arguably led to some of the worst 
consequences of the financial crisis. This idea may be impractical because it 
is hard to define in law the relevant kind of recklessness, because taking risks 
is inseparable from banking, and because the skills of modelling risk in 
modern banking are so sophisticated that they are hard for would-be 
regulators, let alone judges and juries, to understand. The criminalisation of 
recklessness may also be self-defeating because white-collar crime will 
inevitably attract sentences that are relatively light, disappointing the punitive 
intentions of the commission. Furthermore, prosecuting and imprisoning 
bankers would add significantly to the financial costs the state has already had 
to bear in rescuing the banks. 
Nevertheless, there is something right about the idea of criminalising 
financial recklessness in the case of systemically important banks. The 
proposal correctly recognises the need for independent judgement of the 
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behaviour of those at the top of the relevant banks and the appropriateness of 
addressing serious damage to the state’s resources with serious punishment. 
Although the UK FSA is not a model institution,15 it is of the right general 
type for imposing genuine costs on bankers. Firstly, it is a regulatory authority 
subject to the oversight of a democratic central government. This not only 
makes it suitably independent of the banks (at least in theory) but also provides 
a line of accountability to taxpayers, who have been left having to pick up 
after HBOS and its ilk. Secondly, a financial regulatory agency is (or ought to 
be) staffed with people who have a detailed understanding of the duties and 
performance of high office holders in specific banks. Thirdly, such a body is 
well-positioned to understand the kinds of costs that office holders who are 
responsible for recklessness can easily evade when they have a level of legal 
help only they can afford or shrug off because they are so wealthy. 
Leaders of systemically important banks who are reckless in their 
management should not only be exposed to very large fines, as Peter 
Cummings was; in the worst cases—the most costly in money terms and those 
involving the grossest mismanagement—they should be liable to significant 
periods of imprisonment. Chief executives and chief financial officers of 
systemically important banks might be particularly exposed to relevant 
charges when, as in the case of HBOS, borrowing and lending are for years 
demonstrably badly managed. This suggestion adds courts to financial 
regulators as arbiters of punishment and twice removes the judgement of 
appropriate costs from those whose conduct is in question. 
Crosby’s gestures, honourable as they appear to be when compared to the 
inaction and shamelessness of other bankers, seem to lack something if all 
they amount to is his forgoing a little of the icing on his cake. Justice might 
have required him to surrender a portion of the cake itself; but that is not all: 
It is risky, probably unjust, and a misunderstanding of a leadership role in a 
systemically important institution, for the authorities to allow good conduct to 
depend on the personal conscientiousness of individual bankers. 
Notes 
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1 Our reactive attitudes to ourselves in cases like these have great philosophical 
interest. If we blame ourselves for something, then we take responsibility for it. 
Being able to take responsibility—in the sense of acknowledging the action as 
one’s own—may be as important to being responsible as being causally operative 
in the production of the bodily movements that realise the action. This emerges 
from consideration of abnormal agents. Someone who feels deeply alienated from 
his or her actions most of the time is deficient in agency, and this deficiency may 
call into question attributions of blame (Frankfurt, 1988; Watson, 2003). There 
is a connection not only between the ability to take responsibility and unalienated 
agency but also between taking responsibility—in the sense of expansive self-
blame—and the intelligibility of moral luck. If blaming oneself expansively 
makes some sense in the case of the non-negligent car accident in which the child 
is killed, then so (to the same extent) does the judgement that the agent in that 
case has bad moral (outcome) luck. In a relatively recent reflection on the 
arguments for the reality of moral luck that he originally put forward in his 
ground-breaking paper on the subject (Williams, 1981), Bernard Williams has 
insisted on the intelligibility and soundness of agent regret even in cases in which 
bad outcomes are not due to negligence (Williams, 1993). According to Williams, 
it makes sense to blame oneself for a death that was not one’s fault  because that 
outcome is directly connected to what one did or was doing.  
2 Taking responsibility can even mean forgoing due process protections (Sorell, 2002). 
3 The concept of SIFI has been developed by international regulators since 2008 to 
apply to banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms whose failure 
would have large-scale, unwanted economic consequences in economically 
important jurisdictions or globally. SIFIs, as they are now called, are now 
specifically required by international banking regulators to meet new (but 
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arguably insufficiently demanding) capitalisation requirements, for example. 
What are now called SIFIs include the ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks that were bailed out 
by Western governments after 2008, such as RBS, Lloyds, and Citigroup. A 
sufficient condition for systemic importance is that a bank’s failure would bring 
about the more or less immediate failure of many other financial institutions, the 
widespread loss of individuals’ deposits, and widespread runs on other banks, 
sometimes in more than one jurisdiction. Side effects of such a failure could 
include, as in the case of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the paralysis of inter-
bank lending, huge reductions in commercial lending, sudden and sharp declines 
in the values of equities, and protracted deflation. Virtually the only systemically 
important bank to be allowed to fail during the financial crisis was Lehman 
Brothers, which was regulated in the United States. Other systemically important 
banks, including Citigroup in New York and RBS and Lloyds in the UK, received 
tens of billions in direct financial support from the United States and UK 
governments. All systemically important banks were in regular and routine 
contact with regulators before the crisis and in the time leading up to it, and it 
was common knowledge between banks and regulators that the market positions 
of these banks made them highly important to their respective national financial 







6 The bank fared less well later in the ‘London Whale’ scandal.  
7 See its Fourth Report: ‘An Accident Waiting to Happen’: The Failure of HBOS. 
(2013). London: The Stationery Office, p. 7. 
8 Ibid. ch. 3. 
9 Ibid. p. 14 (Table 2). 
10 Ibid. p. 17. 
11 Ibid. p. 38. 
12 Ibid. ch. 5. 
13 Ibid. p. 43. 
14 www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/apr/09/james-crosby-give-up-knighthood-
pension 
15 It has indeed recently been replaced by newly designed specialist agencies dealing 
with system-affecting balance sheet risks, on the one hand, and maladministration 
and mis-selling, on the other. 
